ultras voice concern over plans to clean up calcio

The introduction of compulsory identity cards for fans has caused quite a stir amongst the often hostile but nonetheless powerful supporter movement that is the Ultras of Italy.

The plans are part of a wider approach by Italian football authorities to improve security and reduce levels of fan violence at games which has, in recent years, impacted negatively on match attendance levels.

However, the plans have been met by strong opposition – notably in the shape of angry supporters and reluctant clubs – which has forced the Italian Home Minister, Roberto Maroni, to further delay the start date of the scheme until the beginning of next season.

The details of the proposal are as follows: As of the beginning of next season, any person wishing to purchase either an away ticket to a given match or a season ticket will have to be in possession of an electronic identity card. The card will show a basic profile of the person, including a barcode which will be used to store data and monitor supporter activity.

Supporters will have to apply for the card which, crucially, will only be made available to those persons whose names have been cleared by local police. More specifically, this means that any supporters who have in the past been sentenced to stadium bans at any sports event will not be able to receive an identity card and, therefore, will be prohibited from purchasing tickets to matches.

As well as improving security, it is also hoped that the cards will facilitate the purchase of tickets and the access/flow of supporters to stadiums.

The overriding response to the plans, however, has so far been negative. Large groups of supporters – led by those involved in the Ultras movement – have shown their discontent having last month gathered in the streets of Rome to formally protest against what they consider to be a breach of “human rights”.

Something of an overstatement, I’m sure you’ll agree. Nonetheless, the Ultras groups are angry at the strict extent to which the rules are being applied, specifically relating to the fact that supporters with previous convictions – even including those who have been cleared – will also be prohibited under the new rules.

Moreover, they are concerned that their personal information will be used for marketing purposes, believing that the scheme is more about marketing opportunities for clubs and less about security.

The fact that there are already agreements in place with companies, including VISA and Telecom Italia has hardly helped to nullify the sense of unrest. Maroni’s admission that the scheme will be used as a means to build and develop “virtuous relationships” with supporters has also fuelled a sense of skepticism.

Yet, despite the apparent commercial benefits, the vast majority of Italian clubs are also opposed to the plans. The initial administration costs are huge – especially so for smaller clubs – which goes some way to explain why there has been such a delay in getting plans off the ground. Furthermore, there are concerns as to whether the scheme will actually work to reduce violence in the first place. Clubs are unconvinced, with many dismissing the cards as a gimmick and pointing out that the majority of hooliganism does not typically take place inside stadiums anyway.

From a PR perspective, too, clubs are reluctant to side against the Ultras groups in fear of backlash. In this respect, there is also a concern that the scheme will end up alienating live spectators – specifically ‘casual’ spectators who do not regularly attend matches – encouraging more supporters to stay at home and watch a match on television.

Whether or not the scheme turns out to be a success remains to be seen. The sentiment of the Italian Government and other football authorities to try to clean up the sport is commendable, but I wonder if they might be better off spending their money elsewhere, notably on developing the overall culture of the matchday experience. Initiatives such as free entry for children, better policing and improvements to stadium infrastructure have been successful in England and Germany and could also work in Italy.

Either way, the Ultras groups should take a look at themselves and their own behaviour before grumbling about civil liberties. It is ironic that many of those who have caused such problems in the first place should now have the nerve to protest about how they are treated. Whilst those who are guilty of violent offences to an extent surrender the privilege of ‘human rights’, those who are innocent should be more appreciative towards those trying to protect them. Are these not the same people that would complain about a lack of police intervention, should an attack regrettably take place?

spanish taxman no longer feeling generous

If you drive a car, he’ll tax the street. If you try to sit, he’ll tax your seat. What the late George Harrison didn’t tell us about the Taxman, however, is that if you are a footballer, you will no longer be eligible for the generous tax breaks that have, up until now, been a key factor in encouraging players to move to Spain.

In 2004, the Spanish Government passed a law to lower the tax bracket for high-level ‘foreign executives’ working in the country in an attempt to attract multinational corporations and more of the world’s top professionals to Spain. This law was specifically applicable to non-Spanish residents earning an annual salary of €600,000 or more. This, therefore, included footballers.

Up until now, this has had a favourable impact on football in Spain, providing clubs with a selling-point in which to attract overseas players and, thus, also providing them with a competitive advantage over much of the rest of Europe.

Where foreign players in Germany, Italy and France were paying 45%, 43% and 40% income tax respectively – the rate was 40% in England, although, this will now increase to 50% from April next year – in Spain they were only being asked to pay 23%.

Naturally, this was beneficial to the players in question, who were able to pay significantly less in tax than their counterparts in Europe’s other big leagues, notably that of Italy and England. Yet, this was also beneficial for the clubs in Spain whose marginal costs – relating to players’ salaries – were significantly reduced, especially because many footballers nowadays command contracts based on after-tax salary demands.

To put this into context, this meant that if a player like Kaka wanted to earn an annual salary of, say, £8m after tax, it would cost his club – Real Madrid – just over £10m a year. However, if Chelsea were to offer him the same deal next year, it would cost them about £16m a year. Needless to say, over the course of a five-year contract and a cumulative difference of about £30m, this becomes very expensive.

Very expensive, too, for the Spanish Government. Indeed, after five years of shortfall in public revenue, an agreement is now in place to scrap this rule and start taxing footballers at a rate that is more in line with the rest of Europe.

Consequently, the new law proposes that the tax bracket for these high-earning overseas players should be raised from 24% to 43%. Subject, of course, to parliamentary approval.

Unsurprisingly, the plans have caused much irritation amongst Spanish clubs, the majority of whom argue that the new tax bracket will discourage foreign players from coming to La Liga. Furthermore, they argue that it is the clubs, not the players, that will end up carrying the weight of the taxes, with the aforementioned trend in after-tax salary guarantees – ‘net’ as opposed to ‘gross’ salaries – making it increasingly impossible for clubs to afford such players.

Others, however, are a little less sympathetic, arguing that the tax authorities should treat everyone equally and also that, in an institutional sense, it is the clubs’ fault for allowing players to be paid after-tax salaries in the first place.

More realistically, however, the new proposal represents little more than a marginal blow to the overall competitivity of La Liga. With this in mind, the extent of the impact surrounding such plans should be looked upon with a sense of perspective.

Firstly, because it will not be implemented retrospectively, the new law will not affect players who have already signed contracts with Spanish clubs. Crucially, this means that such players as Kaka and Cristiano Ronaldo – both of whom have recently joined Real Madrid and earn in advance of €160,000 per week – will remain exempt from the new taxation laws, at least until they sign a new contract.

Secondly, it is important to consider that the new proposal will still leave Spanish football in a comparatively good position. With the new tax rates roughly on par with the rest of Europe, this is hardly the same as being left significantly worse off.

Furthermore, the rules only apply to a minority band of well-paid ‘imports’, most of whom are being paid so much anyway that, if a club has enough money to afford them in the first place, then the relative difference in cost – relative to the overall revenue and/or cost of running such a club – is unlikely to affect them too dramatically. This is especially true in the case of clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona although, admittedly, less so for smaller clubs such as Getafe, Tenerife and so on.

In other words, whilst the new law may end up costing the ‘super’ clubs the most, it is also true that they can afford it the most. Given, then, that the overall perception of La Liga is largely determined by the condition of Real Madrid and Barcelona – at least in a superficial sense – then the proposal is unlikely to have too much of a negative affect on the league as a collective.

england 2.0 just a flash in the pan

It’s out with the old and in with the new for the Football Association, who have undergone an altogether rather cosmopolitan transformation in 2009.

The managerial appointment of Fabio Capello twenty or so months ago marked the start of things to come.

Since then, the FA have appointed a new Chief Executive, Ian Watmore, whose arrival coincides with a number of snazzy new proposals that suggest a specific focus on modernisation.

The launch of the new all-white Umbro kit last spring was supported by the release of a new Three Lions crest, updated to achieve “greater standout in today’s digital environment”. The FA also announced that the location of England’s next ‘home’ friendly will be, not Wembley but, 3,000 miles away in Doha, Qatar – a move that is particularly surprising considering the huge costs expended in building the London venue.

Most recently – and for one night only as of Saturday 10th October – the FA announced that England’s World Cup Qualifying match against Ukraine was to be broadcast online in a strictly pay-per-view capacity.

Say hello to the new FA 2.0.

Except don’t. Because this is not really the FA’s doing at all. In fact, the FA seem rather confused as to where they stand amongst all these developments, taking credit and/or endorsing the proposal where it suits them, and passing the buck where it doesn’t. Consider it an accidental trial, then.

But for anyone wondering how and why it is that such a circumstance came about, the answer ultimately lies with FIFA, and a rather nonsensical ruling which states that the television rights to any match sanctioned by the world governing body should be owned and distributed by the football federation of the home nation in participation (in this case, Ukraine).

Indeed, having originally sold the UK branch of these rights to Setanta Sports, the Ukrainian FA found themselves in the unusual position of having to re-sell in view of the pay-TV firm’s collapse earlier this summer.

However, with England’s qualification for the World Cup secured, the UK value of these rights had significantly dropped and so any bid was unlikely to be anywhere near the amount Setanta had initially agreed to pay (reportedly around £5m).

This ultimately left the Ukrainian FA – or Kentaro, an international agency appointed by the Ukrainian FA, to be exact – scampering to find a bidder willing to pay what they considered to be an acceptable amount for these rights.

The BBC reportedly did make an offer – apparently somewhere between £1m and £2m – but it was deemed unsatisfactory for Kentaro, who were seeking a figure closer to £3m.

Both the BBC and ITV also made offers to buy the rights to the highlights; a proposal that was initially rejected by Kentaro – presumably because this would have greatly undermined the unique value of their product and, subsequently, reduced pay-per-view demand – although the BBC did eventually agree on a highlights package, with part of the deal stipulating the announcement would not be made until the conclusion of the match.

Anyway, with no satisfactory offers made by traditional UK broadcasters for the live broadcast, the Ukrainians – again, via Kentaro – decided to “seek the widest possible online audience”. Or, more likely, decided to accept the highest offer from a company who were presumably willing to pay more for what was ultimately a huge PR exercise for them as part of a wider agenda to promote alternative methods of broadcasting. With this, they appointed digital sport specialist Perform to market and stream the match online on a pay-per-view basis.

Despite ending in a loss for England, the match went out without complication and made history as the first England international to be broadcast exclusively over the internet.

Both Kentaro and Perform declared themselves “happy with the interest” which saw approximately 300,000 subscriptions purchased. The fact that the broadcast ran smoothly will have pleased the allied companies, especially considering the technological concerns that were voiced by some people prior to the game – for example, there was a question as to whether or not the website had the capacity to take the high volumes of site traffic which, if over-subscribed, could have meant the website crashed.

Yet the success of the broadcast remained little more than an – albeit essential – practicality in comparison to the wider political debates that inevitably arose surrounding the match and the circumstances in which it was eventually aired. Many were concerned that a ‘national event’ such as this should certainly have been sold to a traditional terrestrial broadcaster, subsequently leaving the Football Association under pressure to respond to accusations that they should have intervened.

In an attempt to clarify the situation, The FA published a statement on the Monday before the game, categorically stating that “Ukraine, as hosts on Saturday, decide who they sell their broadcast rights to”.

This was accompanied by a statement made by FA Director of Communications, Adrian Bevington, who explained that the FA “has had no authority over the decision to broadcast this match exclusively live on the internet. It is the host nation and their commercial agents who have the authority to sell the rights for away fixtures. In this case, the Ukranian FA and their agents have sold the broadcast rights for Ukraine versus England to the company Perform”.

The view from Perform, however, was unsurprisingly a little more positive, insisting that the project had “strategic long-term value” and that is was “not a one-off shot”.

Maybe so, but whether or not this trial represents the shape of sports broadcasting to come, I’m not so sure.

No doubt, the internet is an increasingly powerful medium these days. But where entire institutions, such as the music industry, have suffered radically from the growth of user-generated content and content-sharing websites, sports broadcasting is unlikely to be under threat in quite the same way.

This is predominately because the nature of live sport – and the social context in which it is consumed – is fundamentally very different from that of music. The reasons for this are twofold:

Firstly, the core value in sport as a product will almost always exist in its live broadcast; that is, the overriding value by which football is enjoyed exists within the context of (1) occasion and/or circumstance and (2) the path of uncertainty that comes from not knowing how a match will evolve. The exact opposite can be said of music, however, where in the most part predictability – or, at least familiarity – provides the satisfaction (which is why a good piece of music can be enjoyed over and over again).

To put it another way, where the demand for content ownership or repeated-access is high at any time in the case of music, there is a much larger scale of value depreciation in sports footage.
With this comes the second thing: that it will almost always be preferable for sport to be enjoyed and/or consumed in the company of others, as opposed to music, which is often consumed in solitude.

In this respect, I would suggest that, if the future of broadcasting does exist in the form of the internet, much depends on how well – in terms of both quality and ease – the internet can be transferred to our televisions. Although one can easily ‘play’ a computer through a TV screen, the internet certainly has a long way to go if it is to compete with the quality of definition that is nowadays available on television, particularly through developments in satellite and digital broadcasting, LCD screens and high-definition (HD) cameras.

Not that I would suggest that football can only be enjoyed in HD. Far from it. But the quality of online broadcasting is currently that much worse that, as a choice of medium, it presently remains little more than a fall-back option to desperate viewers stuck – perhaps abroad, perhaps at an office – to find a better way to watch a game.

Perhaps the future of online broadcasting, then, depends more on how the overall relationship between the internet and television evolves over the next decade or so, not just in terms of sport. It is reasonable to suggest that, if significant developments are made in the quality of online video and the capacity of bandwidths, then the internet could take over from other forms of television – including satellite – as the primary means of broadcasting, meaning households would tend to watch all their television through a wireless internet connection linked to a television, instead of through, say, a Sky box powered by a dish, or through an aerial; in which case the nature of sports broadcasting would, naturally, do the same.

Nevertheless, the biggest issue that exists in relation to football at the minute is not so much that of the internet, as the issue of pay-per-view. As the failed case of Setanta suggests, the concept of pay-per-view has never really taken off. With such obligations as the mandatory purchase of a UK television license and other such taxes – not to mention that the vast majority of households now shell out an increasingly large monthly fee for the privilege of Sky, or some other form of digital television – it is perhaps understandable that members of the public are simply not happy to pay even further.

With this in mind, it is hard to imagine that Perform’s online pay-per-view experiment will take off. More likely, the internet will continue to be used as an after-the-event, highlights medium for viewers to enjoy on-demand through websites such as YouTube and FootyTube. The key challenge over the next few years – as has been within the music industry – will be to establish a sustainable model of monetisation, notably relating to ways in which content, rights and copyrights are sold and/or regulated, as well as looking at where advertisers and sponsors can most effectively be integrated.

As for the FA, my advice to them would be to not look too far into these developments, at least for the time being. They are right to adapt with technological and social progress but they must be careful not to surrender in the face of money. The institutional attachment between football and the BBC, for example, is one of the few good traditions that still exists in sport, and one that should be preserved.

beware a summer of kaka boom from uncle florentino and madrid

He’s the rich uncle who always gives the best presents at Christmas; the loaded mate who throws his gold-card behind the bar at parties.

This is decadence in its purest form, but no-one questions the motivations or morality behind it when it’s they who reap the benefits.

In Madrid, that man is Florentino Perez who, for the second time in a decade, has been elected as president of Real Madrid. The billionaire construction magnate stood unopposed for candidacy having emerged as the outstanding choice to succeed the previous regime, led by Ramon Calderon. Calderon’s administration was earlier this year accused of rigging a vote to approve the club’s financial budgets.

Perez is, of course, most famous for bringing about the ‘Galactico’ movement at Real Madrid in the early 2000s. In his first term as Real Madrid president, Perez endeavored to assemble a ‘dream team’, signing high-profile players such as Ronaldo, Luis Figo, Zinedine Zidane and David Beckham.

“A superstar every summer”, he said last time. Yet now, in 2009, Perez has bought several superstars in a matter of weeks. The Brazilian Kaka and the Portuguese Cristiano Ronaldo are the most high-profile signings, with French forward Karim Benzema and a series of Spanish stars – Liverpool midfielder Xabi Alonso most recently joining defenders Raul Albiol and Alvaro Arbeloa – completing the list.

Overall, Perez has spent over £200m on players this summer.

For, everybody loves Florentino in the summer. In the same way that everybody loves a generous uncle at Christmas.

But where, as many people are asking, is it that Perez and Madrid are getting all this money from?

The answer is, in fact, far less suspicious than the question suggests, and revolves around a simple philosophy that short-term credit should be invested in highly marketable commodities (in his case, players) whose high-profile ensures this money will be made back over time.

So, in the short-term, Perez has managed to secure a considerable bank loan – or a series of separate loans, depending on which story you believe – for a total sum of around, well, hundreds of millions of pounds. Catalan bank La Caixa are believed to have provided the majority of credit, whilst a number of newspapers have reported that Banco Santander have virtually single-handedly funded Cristiano Ronaldo’s deal.

How are they able to obtain such large loans, especially when the rest of the world are apparently undergoing a ‘crunch’ on the amount of money currently being lent by banks?

Well, Perez provides financial guarantees from the revenues of his construction company ACS (which generates over £4bn in annual revenues) and his political power – as well as the power Real Madrid has as a club – also allows him a favourable relationship with national banks. Because the club is seen as something of a national symbol, it is well supported by the city council and the Spanish government. Consider it in some way similar to such institutions as Wembley Stadium or the 2012 London Olympics in England. Barcelona, incidentally, maintains a similar position within the region of Catalonia.

With these loans secured, Florentino Perez plans to recuperate this money in the long-term via the implementation of a highly aggressive commercial strategy, the core activity of which has already been put in place through the purchases of both Kaka and Ronaldo.

Put simply, Perez believes that spending huge amounts of money on the world’s most high-profile players will generate commercial benefits so powerful that they greatly exceed the initial cost of the player. “Sometimes the most expensive players are the cheapest”, Perez said. "The cheapest player I ever signed was Zidane. Signing stars is not spending money, it is investing it."

In principle, the concept works. There are a small number of players whose global profile is so strong – that much stronger than anyone else’s – that their sheer association with a product (or football club) can increase the relative income of all other aspects relating to the club.

The most prolific example of this model in practice is David Beckham. Beckham cost Real around £25m in 2003, a fee which was more than recuperated in shirt sales alone. In fact, over a million ‘Beckham 23’ shirts were sold in the first 5 months of him joining the club. Furthermore, David Beckham earned Madrid more than £340m in merchandising alone over his first three seasons, increasing profits by 137%, or so the club claims.

The relative impact this then has on all other revenue streams is substantial:

Clearly, in terms of attendance, the presence of high-profile players means a higher demand for match tickets. Given that home matches regularly sell out, this is hardly a problem that needs to be addressed at the club. However, the potential is there – at least, in theory – to hike up ticket prices and still sell out.

Incidentally, Madrid’s matchday revenue has already increased significantly in the past couple of years due to the reconfiguring of specific areas at the stadium to increase corporate hospitality capacity.

The affect a big-name signing has on TV rights, however, is far more significant: Real Madrid negotiate the sale of their television rights independently – as opposed to collectively as part of a league, as is the case in England – which means they can command disproportionately high fees compared to most other clubs around the world.

To put this into perspective, clubs in England make around £28m per year from TV rights, whereas Real Madrid make approximately £120m a year, having secured a record-breaking global deal worth £1.1bn over seven years, in 2006. Considering the worldwide interest in these players – particularly in places like Asia – the arrival of Kaka and Ronaldo could mean Madrid’s next deal is even greater.

The situation is much the same with regards to sponsorship. The arrival of star names will add significant strength to the club’s ability to attract new (or renew existing) sponsors. Online gaming firm Bwin currently contribute approximately £15m per year, and Adidas pay significantly more in image rights.

There are also a number of other commercial opportunities open to Florentino Perez and Real Madrid. Merchandising – not just in terms of shirt sales – and overseas tours are part of the strategy to generate many more millions, particularly in the American and Asian markets. For example, Perez recently bragged about how, in the height of the original Galactico era, he once made the club €15m for playing two matches in Japan.

But commercial muscle does not necessarily mean success on the field, and people have short memories in this respect. There is, after all, a good reason why no-one wants to see gold-card party-boy friend every night – or ever in the daytime, for that matter.

Indeed, for all his extravagance and the excitement that surrounds him, Florentino Perez is also both a populist and an autocrat.

He likes publicity and dictates transfer policy – which means new Real Madrid coach Manuel Pellegrini will have to make do with what is bought for him, and that he is unlikely to have any control over transfers.

Pellegrini may also be forced to comply with the so-called ‘unwritten rule’ surrounding team selection. This basically means that superstar signings must start every game. Oh, and though shalt never drop Raul.

Perez’s failure to prioritise the importance of defensive players has also caused him problems in the past. In 2003, Perez was involved in a pay dispute with Claude Makelele which, ultimately, resulted in the Frenchman being sold to Chelsea. Perez was unwilling to pay high wages for a player he considered to be inferior to the likes of Ronaldo and Zidane, saying: "We will not miss Makelele. His technique is average, he lacks the speed and skill to take the ball past opponents, and 90% of his distribution either goes backwards or sideways."

Given the negative publicity that was generated from the Makelele affair, one would think that such a situation is unlikely to happen again. Although much depends on how much Florentino has learnt from past mistakes.

Clearly, no-one can doubt that the arrival of Florentino Perez has, so far, been impactful. But the question continues as to whether or not his policies are sustainable.

Some would argue that the continued use of the electoral system in place at Madrid fuels and ensures instability at the club: Wrapped up as democracy, the set-up ultimately only serves to further promote an institution of short-termism, populism and, therefore, superficiality.

In this sense, Florentino’s plans are exciting – ‘fun’, even – but a philosophy built on immediacy and commercially-driven success is simply not the best recipe for either the development or stability of the club. It’s certainly no way to build a team. But then this is Real Madrid, after all, and perhaps the soap opera was always destined to continue. I guess we’ll all just have to wait until Christmas to see what Uncle Florentino conjures up next. Whatever it is, Perez will do well to remember the following fact: that even the most expensive Champagne still leaves you with a hangover.

all change italy

2006 was a defining, although bittersweet year for Italian football. The Calciopoli match-fixing scandal tainted the achievements of the national team winning the World Cup, leaving Italian football suspended in a state of recovery.

The reputation of the sport in Italy has no doubt been damaged. Many remain sceptical about the degree of corruption within the Serie A league and, in addition, there is a problem with fan violence – a concern which has, in part, impacted negatively on match attendance levels. Italian football is simply not as powerful as it once was.

The continued success of the English Premier League has hardly helped, further undermining the position of Serie A in relation to the rest of the world. It is no secret that England has the most lucrative domestic league in the world: combined revenues of Premier League clubs reached a record £1.93bn last year, nearly £900m more than that recorded in Italy. And when Premier League clubs completed a clean-sweep over Italian rivals in the UEFA Champions League this year – Roma, Juventus and Inter Milan were beaten by Arsenal, Chelsea and Manchester United consecutively – Serie A could no longer argue England’s superiority was solely financial.

For the Italians, this is not a satisfactory position, and so it has been decided that the time has come for a change. With this in mind, Serie A clubs have voted in favour of a new commercial structure, in an attempt to emulate the achievements of the Premier League.

The proposed idea is to make Serie A an independent league, detached from the rest of Italian football and governed independently. It is a model similar to that currently deployed in England – where you have the Premier League and then the rest (i.e. the Football League) – although ultimately developed from the commercial approach to professional sport set by the United States (through the NBA, MLB and NFL).

Undoubtedly, the primary motive behind this move towards independence concerns the sale and distribution of television rights.

Television rights deals make up for approximately one-third of a football club’s annual income, which is why rules surrounding distribution represents such a significant and contentious issue.

Up until now, clubs in Italy have sold their broadcast rights independently to media channels. This has tended to favour the bigger clubs in the sense that a higher price can be commanded for a club with a large following, who have the biggest stars and who are likely to compete in important matches. In turn, these clubs can then better afford to buy certain players, and so on.

As a result, there now exists a cycle which has, ultimately, helped to create a greater disparity between the rich and the poor in Serie A. Last season, for example, Inter Milan sold their TV rights for a fee in excess of £85m, whereas Chievo – a comparatively smaller club, although one that still competes in Serie A – sold theirs for only £4m. A similar policy exists in Spain where the cost for the top clubs is, in fact, even greater. In 2006, Real Madrid sold their global television rights for a record-breaking £1.1bn over seven years, helping them to officially become the richest club in the world.

Yet there is a catch, at least as far as the big clubs in Italy are concerned. In exchange for these revenues, Serie A clubs currently contribute a proportion of the proceeds – ordinarily about 20% – to their counterparts in Serie B. In terms of a collective total, this typically amounts to around £90m (although it was negotiated down to £60m for the season just gone).

Because each club’s contribution is proportional to the size of their TV deal, Serie A clubs have, at least up until now, been happy to accept the policy: it did not cost particularly much for the smaller clubs and, for the bigger clubs, it was a small price to pay to ensure the continued benefits of large broadcasting deals so, relatively-speaking, everyone was satisfied.

However, since clubs in Serie A voted for the league to be run independently, the rights for those clubs in the top division will now be sold collectively. This means that, much like that which occurs in the English Premier League, media firms will buy Serie A rights as a whole, and the cumulative cost will be split almost evenly across the division. No direct compensation will be paid to Serie B.

The implications of such a change are significant. The idea is to improve the overall state of the league, financial and otherwise. In principle, a more even distribution of money will improve the competitiveness of all clubs – not just the big four of Juve, Milan, Inter and Roma – which will, in turn, lead to a stronger and more-balanced league.

In reality, however, the change offers mixed prospects.

In the short-term, this will upset the big, ‘upper-class’ clubs – such as Juventus, Inter, AC Milan and Roma – who will no longer be able to command such disproportionately high fees for TV rights. However, these clubs are likely to be able to make up for this loss in the long-term, assuming the overall and eventual impact of this new deal is as positive (financially) as is hoped.

The change will greatly benefit the ‘middle-classes’, strengthening the position of medium-sized clubs such as Genoa, Cagliari, Lazio and Parma. More money will be available to these clubs which should, in theory, allow them to compete more readily in Europe to afford the best players, invest in better stadiums and facilities etc. Having high-profile players, for example, attracts more high-profile players which, in turn, leads to increased demand, which allows for higher prices to be charged, better television rights deals, and so the cycle goes on.

The proposed change is, however, bad news for second division clubs in Italy. The majority of clubs in Serie B are already losing money: on average, clubs lost around £5m each last season, and that is after the compensatory money received from Serie A.

In terms of operating costs, these clubs have been paying wages comparable to those in the Coca-Cola Championship in England, despite the fact that average attendances are about one-third – and stadium revenues about one-tenth – of those in the English second division.

Yet, despite this dilemma, Serie A clubs simply cannot afford to continue bailing out the poorly-run business practices of Serie B. In this respect – and unless a compromise is established – the future looks precarious for Serie B clubs, particularly for those clubs that enter the division through relegation from Serie A.

In England, relegation from the Premier League has seen a number of clubs forced into administration, and that is after the provision of significant ‘parachute’ payments that are issued to relegated clubs. For all its achievements, the success of the Premier League has made it very difficult for clubs not competing in the top tier to contend financially, meaning there is now an increasingly imposing divide between the rich and the poor.

It does not take a rocket scientist to see the similarities between the circumstances that have existed in England and those now likely to impend upon Italy. And with the increasing prospect of Serie A becoming something of a new Premier League, Italy must be wary not to lead its nation’s football league too far down a similar path.

Indeed, there are a number of lessons to be learnt, most notably surrounding takeovers that have been largely funded by debt. Manchester United, for example, were not in debt before being bought by the American, Malcolm Glazer, in 2005. However, Glazer funded his takeover by borrowing money secured against the club's future earnings. A similar situation also exists at Liverpool, where George Gillett and Tom Hicks took out a £185m loan in order to finance their takeover of the club.

In the case of clubs like Chelsea and Manchester City, the situation is different, but concerning in another way. These clubs are essentially funded by interest-free loans from the personal finances of wealthy individuals (such as the oligarch, Roman Abramovich). This means that, although they have access to large amounts of money at present, there is an issue of vulnerability in terms of their operative sustainability; that is, these clubs may not be able to meet their costs should investors suddenly pull out.

Similar circumstances are imminent in Italy.

Just this week, in Rome, a Swiss consortium led by soccer agent Vinicio Fioranelli, became the latest group to have been linked with a takeover of AS Roma. Fioranelli’s group represent the fifth potential buyer to have emerged in the last year; the others including American billionaire businessman George Soros, the dynastic Flick family of Germany, pharmaceutical magnate Francesco Angelini and a group of unnamed Arab investors.

Although no bids have so far been accepted, Roma’s long-standing owners, the Sensi family, are believed to be under pressure to find investment owing to increasing debts already suffered, not by Roma itself but, by the club’s current majority owners, Italpetroli. Italpetroli is an oil storage company controlled by the Sensi family which, essentially, acts as a holding company to AS Roma. Roma’s inherent debts are currently estimated in the region of £350m, relative to Italpetroli’s 64% stake in the club. In this sense, Roma are hardly strangers to the concept of debt and takeovers.

Historically, the majority of clubs in Italy have been owned by dynastic families – such as the aforementioned Sensi family of Roma – few of which have ever intended to sell off what they see as a family tradition.

But money talks, especially in football. Given, too, that there are currently no explicit sets of laws in place to prevent a barrage of foreign investment in Italy, Roma may well be paving the way for other such clubs to do the same. Brace yourselves, Europe. The Romans are coming (again)…

only chris waddle understands me

There is a wonderful Simpsons episode, entitled ‘Homer’s Enemy’, which resembles a sort of modern, dark-humoured version of ‘The Emperor’s New Clothes’. The story is about a man called Frank Grimes who is employed at the Nuclear Power Plant to work alongside Homer. Grimes is a bitter man, disillusioned and frustrated by the fact that someone as stupid as Homer should be so well rewarded in society. He becomes incensed at people’s inability to see that Homer is a fool, and his attempts to find empathy from others – mainly in the form of rants to co-workers, Lenny and Carl – result in him being told “Hey, what’s wrong with Homer anyway?”

Angry and feeling like the world is against him, Grimes goes out of his way to show Homer up and prove he has the intelligence of a child. He enters him into a design contest intended for children, a detail of which Homer is unaware.

However, Homer inevitably wins first prize and – unfortunately for Grimes – instead of being ridiculed, Homer is applauded. Overwhelming cheers from the audience cause Grimes to finally snap: he runs around shouting “Why can’t anybody see this man is an idiot!” before adopting a mocking persona of his ‘enemy’. Impersonating Homer, Grimes furiously storms around doing stupid things, declaring “I can do anything because I’m Homer Simpson”, before getting so carried away in the process that he eventually electrocutes himself by accident and dies.

Last Autumn, I felt like Frank Grimes.

Let me take you back to September of last year and the World Cup Qualifying match between England and Croatia which saw a first England start for Theo Walcott, culminating in a hat-trick. What followed was a delirious and over-blown media and public response.

Was I the only person in the country who thought that both England and Walcott were, not great but just, not bad? As it turns out, my friend Andreas agreed with me, as did Chris Waddle, apparently. I think it’s safe to assume that, had he been alive, and had he not been a fictitious cartoon character, Frank Grimes would have agreed, too. Thanks Frank, this one’s for you.

But the support I received in the form of a cartoon was not enough to restore my sense of sanity. On the Thursday morning after the match, I read a number of articles reviewing England’s performance: The Sun described the night as “heroic”, but even the supposedly more respectable publications in the press, such as The Times and the BBC, went crazy.

The BBC Sport website claimed that “in the wonderful Walcott, (England) had a player who frightened the life out of the hosts whenever he got the ball”. This overstatement was supported by The Times who, for the first time in it’s history, awarded Walcott with a ‘ten out of ten’ mark accompanied by the phrase “Walcott terrified (Croatia left-back) Pranjic from the very first minute”. If nothing else, this is just inaccurate. Anyone who saw it will know that Walcott made an incredibly shaky start to the game. In 20 minutes he made a series of incomplete passes, lost out to Pranjic in every header or challenge and, on the one occasion he did find space in the Croatian penalty area, he rather embarrassingly (albeit unluckily) tripped, mis-hit his cross and fell on the floor.

Walcott’s goals were decent, but only really in the sense that he finished well. He was lucky with the first one, which fell kindly in his path thanks to a mis-hit clearance by the Croatian defence. His second was a very good goal, but I would argue Walcott merely added the finishing touch to some nice passing from – among others – Wayne Rooney. I will credit him with good positioning here, however, I will also add that, by this time, Croatia were down to ten men due to a red card received by Josep Simunic – incurred for an elbow on Joe Cole – which made it easier for England to find space. Granted, Walcott’s third was a nice run and finish.

Blind adulation continued in the days and weeks that followed. Ludicrous comparisons with Lionel Messi and Thierry Henry, and an article in The Times about how Walcott’s hat-trick will lead to a tripling of his salary in order to “stave off interest from Manchester City who may well bid up to £50million for the player” made me scratch my head with disbelief. Terrible business.

Even up to a month later, Walcott continued to draw exaggerated praise in the aftermath of his achievement. He was awarded man-of-the-match by the Daily Telegraph for an average performance – culminating in an early-ish substitution – in Arsenal’s 4 0 win over Porto in the Champions League. Robin Van Persie and Emanuel Adebayor both scored twice that night and Cesc Fabregas proved himself as the best player on the pitch yet, as the only Englishman on show, the papers clearly felt the need to exaggerate Walcott’s influence.

Even recently – when England played Spain – there was talk of how the team were “missing the likes of Ferdinand, Gerrard, Rooney and Walcott”. Forgive me, but since when was it decided that Walcott should be considered in the same company as these players?

I suppose the answer is that Walcott has become something of a Golden Boy. And, so, it seems to have been universally decided – that is, by advertisers, The FA and other such persons – that Walcott shall be the new face of everything relating to English football. The chosen one, so to speak. Since the inception of this sort of unofficial pronouncement, Walcott has appeared in almost all Arsenal-related photographs in English newspapers and Football Association PR. Clearly this is very much a conscious decision based on representation as opposed to it being down to legitimate sporting merit or, even, sheer coincidence.

In many ways, it is not hard to see why Walcott has been chosen. To them, Walcott has the perfect mix: He is young, English, refreshingly well-mannered and also black. Or ‘slightly black’, as Jimmy Carr would say. Even better.

Yet the problem is that Walcott is not actually that good. And where this gets interesting is that Walcott’s Golden Boy status means he is largely protected and treated favourably by the media. Clearly there is an irony here – in that this protection is coming from the same people that have put him in the firing line in the first place – but let us not forget that the overriding benefits of such high-levels of media adulation have, ultimately, seen Walcott given more opportunities than his peers: Evidently Sven Goran Eriksson did not decide to pick him for the World Cup in 2006 on merit, and he has not been criticised (or worse, ignored) in the same way another player might be. You may remember a similar thing happened to Peter Crouch during his first games at Liverpool. The player became a cult figure in his failure to score in 17 appearances. Whilst such a failure would have ordinarily meant demotion and the loss of a place in the team, Crouch was lauded with unfounded praise and man-of-the-match awards. Anyone could see Steven Gerrard was the best player in every game – he always is – but propaganda in favour of Crouch led to him being picked for the England team amidst exaggerations that he was a “threat in the air” and that “opposition defenders are terrified of him as they don’t know how to defend against him”.

When watching Walcott, I see a nice guy with a good attitude and good potential, but who currently has just one defining attribute, which is his pace. Call me a spoil-sport but, to me, I’m afraid everything else about him – at least at present – appears very much unpolished. Where everyone else sees a lightning quick winger who can torment opposition defenders, I see a young boy who is being elevated too quickly; a boy whose ball control and first-touch is poor, whose passing is inaccurate, who panics, who is weak and who is rarely a dominant presence in a game. Such criticisms are understandable for a 19yr old, and one would expect to see an improvement over time, but I find it hard to understand why people are so insistent on seeing him play for England now. Even if – unlike me – you are someone who believes that David Beckham should be dropped from England’s right-midfield, then I would argue there are still probably three or four players that should stand ahead of Walcott in the pecking order: Shaun Wright-Philips, Aaron Lennon, Ashley Young, James Milner, Gabriel Agbonlahor and David Bentley, for example.

In a Grimes-like moment of madness, I did some research on this and found that Arsenal’s other ‘winger’, Samir Nasri – the closest thing I could find to Walcott’s counterpart – makes, on average, more than twice as many passes as Walcott per game. Statistics from one particular game this season (Arsenal away at Fulham in August) showed that, in the same amount of time on the field, Nasri made 38 passes (55 overall), whereas Walcott only made 16, a quarter of which were unsuccessful. This is a poor record, especially when you consider that Nasri is hardly Pele himself. Comparisons with the likes of Cristiano Ronaldo were even less favourable, and even James Milner – who plays for a team who typically have far less possession than Arsenal do – tended to have a more positive record.

But for this to turn into a vilification of Theo Walcott himself would entirely miss the point. My wider frustration is against (1) the English media, who have, once again, ignored any sense of reality in favour of rushing to catapult someone to super-stardom, and (2) the football-watching general public. Of those I spoke to after the game, all had an opinion on England’s “incredible” performance, yet the majority admitted they had either only caught the second half or – owing to the fact that the game was only broadcast on Setanta – had missed the game altogether. This is typical of the problem. Too many people have seen the scoreline and seen that Walcott has scored three goals, and have subsequently marvelled on these facts alone. Such an ignorant attitude is all too often seen in sport and life in general.

Clearly I understand that it is impossible to see every game. Even if you could, it would be impossible to watch any game without some sort of bias (from a commentator or even the reaction of other people), but I believe it is important to watch as much actual raw football as possible, before forming an opinion.

I suppose that, in many ways, this comes down to the fact that the majority of football ‘fans’ do not really love football as a sport, but are attracted to it because it is – at least on the surface – easy to understand and, thus, it provides a topic (just like politics, reality television and the weather) for everyone to feel they are an expert and give his or her (most likely unfounded) opinion. In this respect, I do appreciate the sense of hope someone like Walcott offers to England as a national community, but I am discouraged by the mistruths, not to mention unfair expectation, pressure and subsequent personal damage that tends to come with this sort of thing.

Anyway, I’m sorry to have gone all Frank Grimes on you. And I’m sorry to have taken it out on poor little Theo Walcott, it’s not his fault. I would say this sort of thing doesn’t happen very often, but that would be untrue.

foster frustrated by evergreen van der sar, but what is a goalkeeper made of?

Whether talking with friends or prophesising to millions on national television (think Alan Hansen’s ‘you can’t win anything with kids’), there is a sort of unofficial disclaimer that comes with any kind of sporting proclamation that says ‘I know very well the risk of being a know-all, but I ask you to grant me the benefit of the doubt should I be proved wrong’, or something.

With this in mind, it is ironic that, in a season that had been expected to be his last – not least by me (see disclaimer above) – Manchester United’s Edwin Van Der Sar has signed a new contract until 2011, breaking a Premier League record for the longest time ever to have not conceded a goal along the way.

Such a record, it must be said, is hardly one that should be attributed to Van Der Sar alone. Certainly, it says more about Man Utd’s good form than it does anything else. Indeed, Van Der Sar has been around long enough to know how fickle such records can be. Such is the curious and thankless position of being a goalkeeper – make one mistake, and you go from seemingly invincible to undependable.

Take the case of Iker Casillas, the best goalkeeper in the world: No sooner had he lifted the European Cup as captain of Spain on the back of, not one but, many fine seasons as Real Madrid’s most consistent player, than he became victim of criticism that he is ‘not the player he once was’, all because of one or two small mistakes.

Needless to say, Casillas has since regained his form, at least as far as the media are concerned – if you ask me he never looked slack – but I think this example says as much about the nature of being a goalkeeper as it does about the ever-reproachful disposition of the media.

In this sense, it is interesting to consider what it is that makes the goalkeeping position so unique. I would argue that, whilst it is inevitable that any player will face criticism at some point in their career – not even Zinedine Zidane is (or was) immune from this – a goalkeeper seems to be scrutinized more heavily than that of any other position. Or is that they are simply scrutinized in a different way?

Certainly, the most obvious attribute that differentiates the goalkeeper from any other position is that he can use his hands. But what is more interesting is the by-product that comes with this, in the fact that there is only room for one goalkeeper in a given team. This means that, unlike in the case of an outfield player – who can, to an extent, either fill in for or play alongside any number of players – the goalkeeper is 100% inadaptable and, so, the position is a lot more competitive in terms of the ratio between opportunities to play and the number of players in contention for a place in the team. Continuing the Manchester United theme, Darren Fletcher, for example, may see his chances of getting in the team improved if any one of Paul Scholes, Michael Carrick, Anderson, Ji-Sung Park, Cristiano Ronaldo, Ryan Giggs or maybe even John O’Shea or Gary Neville get injured. The same cannot be said for Ben Foster or Tomasz Kuszczak, who wait their turn behind Van Der Sar himself.

Such high levels of competition might help to explain the overall negative attitude towards the current selection of English goalkeepers. Personally, I reject the belief that the English national team are short of good goalkeepers to choose from. In Chris Kirkland, David James, Robert Green, Paul Robinson, Ben Foster and (maybe) Scott Carson, I think England have an encouraging list of options. So much so that I wonder if it is the case that England – and, indeed, the players in question – are simply suffering from the fact that there are just too many goalkeepers of a similar standard (that would be ‘very good’ but not ‘exceptional’), and the sheer amount of competition has made it difficult for any player to settle or hold down a place in the team.

Certainly, this adds to the issue of increased media scrutiny. More generally, however, this is simply the result of the goalkeeper representing the last line between the opposition striker and the goal, meaning any mistake he makes is likely to be critical. This, in turn, means the goalkeeper’s every move is also critical and so the level of pressure he is put under to perform even the most basic actions is far more than that of any outfield player. If a striker slightly miscontrols the ball in the final third of the pitch where he is attacking, for example, he might concede possession in the form of a throw-in. Even if he gives the ball directly to the opposition, his mistake is unlikely to be critical as there is still plenty of space/grass and, indeed, defenders in his favour. Yet, if a goalkeeper miscontrols a pass in his area, he may very well concede a goal a second later.

This, ultimately, results in a natural inconsistency surrounding how a player is judged: the difference between what I like to call ‘positive and negative marking’…

Generally-speaking, if a striker misses a chance – or even five chances – he can make up for it by scoring a goal, so he is marked ‘positively’. Whereas, a goalkeeper can only make errors in the case of messing up a straightforward situation, so he is marked ‘negatively’, as it were.

To further put this into context, if a goalkeeper has had a quiet game, he (along with his defence) has probably done a good job; whereas if a striker has had a quiet game, he has probably not had a particularly good day. Yet, if a goalkeeper has been the centre of attention, it is either because his defence has been so bad that the other team has created a number of chances, or it is because he has made a costly error.

In this sense, one could argue that the individual successes or failures of a goalkeeper – at least, within in an individual match – will ordinarily come at the direct expense or profit of those successes or failures felt collectively by the team: A goalkeeper can only excel if defensive mistakes are made by his team. This is not true in the ultimate sense – because good or bad goalkeeping may mean the difference between a team either winning or losing – but it is true for independent situations within a match itself. I accept it is not a watertight argument, but it is certainly one worth pondering, especially for a player like Ben Foster, who I mentioned earlier…

Indeed, I wonder if the thought-process behind such a theory may tempt Foster into making a loan move to a lower club. It is true to say that the recent success of Edwin Van Der Sar has come at the expense of the younger goalkeepers at Manchester United, notably Foster himself. Since joining the club four years ago, Foster’s most successful period has come, not at Old Trafford but, at Vicarage Road where he spent two years on-loan at Watford. Despite Watford’s relegation from the Premier League, Foster impressed, and was eventually called up to the English national team.

Temporary moves like this allow young players to gain and maintain a level of confidence through playing regularly but, unlike in the case of an outfield player – who has to weigh up the risk of not excelling at a lower level and thus, ultimately, risking his profile – a goalkeeper does not have this problem because, as we have established, playing for a poor team can actually even enhance his reputation as he has more opportunities to make saves, as was the case for Foster at Watford.

As for the future of this young goalkeeper, I suppose we will have to wait and see. Certainly, he is a player of great potential, but he has lost momentum, of late. He was forced to have surgery on his knee prior to the 2007/08 season, unsettling his position for the coming season, and has generally not played more than the occasional game since. Clearly this has affected his confidence – if not ultimately, then certainly in the short-term.

Although he should stay at Man Utd in the long-term, Foster needs to play, and I believe he would greatly benefit from making another loan-move, whether it be to a Premier League club or otherwise. Foster is still only 25, so the possibility that he will one day play for Manchester United and England on a regular basis is still very much there. In the meantime, who would have predicted that – in Edwin Van Der Sar and David James – Foster’s opportunities would be frustrated by two players nearing their forties? Not me, is the answer to that question…

quotas unlikely to change the landscape

There is a truism that says ‘rules are not necessarily sacred, principles are’. This could hardly be more pertinent than in the case of the Football League who, after many years of deliberation, has announced plans to implement a quota on the number of home-grown players competing in English football. Club members voted in favour of the proposal, which will be effective as of the beginning of next season, 2009/10. Under the new rule, at least four of the 16 players named in a matchday squad will need to have been registered domestically for a minimum of three seasons before their 21st birthday.

In principle, the aim of the proposal is to create a platform in which to safeguard academies and to reward clubs who invest heavily in youth development. But what does this really mean for the future of English football?

Well, certainly in the short-term, it means very little; not least because, on its inception, the quota will only apply to the Football League. This refers to the three divisions that sit below the Premier League and, so, does not include the Premier League itself, despite the fact that this is the only 'place' where the issue of clubs having too many foreign players is considered a problem. Current research suggests that only 2 of the current 72 clubs in the Football League would need to even consider making a change to their current team selection in order to meet the new rules. To put this into perspective, consider the whole issue sort of like a union of local greengrocers being encouraged to vote in favour of a law that all produce must be harvested locally, except that the rule is not applicable to supermarket chains.

In this respect, I would question the motives of the Football League, in the sense that I think this is more of a political move than it is about finding a genuine and sustainable solution to a problem. Even the Chairman of the Football League, Lord Mawhinney hinted that this whole process was little more than a proclamation, saying: “We believe it is time for the Football League to make an unequivocal statement”, followed by some other unspecific spiel.

Not that I entirely blame him. Whilst I unreservedly believe it is up to these governing bodies and authorities to work with integrity and in the very best interests of the societies in which they are responsible for, it is also true that The FA and the Football League have been put under immense pressure by both the public and the media to address such issues. In this sense, it is hardly surprising that they would have felt coerced into responding as they have. Considered from this point of view, the voting system behind the proposal essentially allows the Football League to emphasize its democratic stance at the same time as ensuring that the issue has been dealt with. It says: “You voted for this, guys. We are doing what you’ve asked of us”, even though there were no other options in which to vote for and you were hardly given a choice.

Indeed, I think the majority of Football League Club Chairmen would acknowledge that they voted in favour of the quotas because it would have been bad PR not to. Few have a vested interest in the long-term future of the game; not that I’m not saying they are bad people, just that the vote is as good as pointless to them. Dick Knight, Chairman of Brighton and Hove Albion – who, incidentally, is the only club member who voted against the proposal – supports this viewpoint, suggesting that “the measure does not address the real issue, I’m sure every Football League club already meets the criteria. This just adds an unnecessary level of paperwork for all clubs”. Knight certainly seems to have a point.

Yet, in fairness to Lord Mawhinney, he has stressed that the proposal is just the first step and that it could pave the way for tougher laws in the future – presumably this means an introduction to the Premier League at some stage?

If this does turn out to be the case, then it certainly makes for stronger long-term implications with respect to the future of English football, although I still don’t think it will take us any closer to finding a solution to the supposed problems with foreign players.

This is largely due to the fact that the majority of people seem to be somewhat misinformed as to what the real problem is. It is clear to me that there is a fundamental myth surrounding the issue of foreign players in England, which surrounds the belief that young players are not getting their chance because these foreign players are taking their place. This is not altogether true or, at least, it certainly is not as simple as this. What is happening is that big clubs are signing prospective talents from other (smaller) clubs and these players are not getting their chance once they have been bought. This happens because the big clubs tend to already have very good players. In some cases these better players are foreign, but the trend would be the same even if these players were English. ‘Poaching’, as it is otherwise known, exists more as a consequence of the large amounts of money that have come into football in the past few decades than it does because of players’ nationalities. Football is big business nowadays, largely controlled by rich people who desire more money and quick-fix success. Needless to say, this has led to a competitive and ruthless environment which, in turn, has led to reduced opportunites for young English players.

Obviously, Globalisation has played its part – in the sense that there is a larger pool of young and inexpensive talent in which to choose from – but this is a political issue beyond that of football. One of the reasons the Football League did not consider adopting the ‘6+5’ proposal put forward by Sepp Blatter, the FIFA President – that would limit the number of foreigners in an English team to five – was because it is illegal on the grounds that it breaches European Union rules on freedom of movement for workers. The point is that the Government cannot advocate a common European market and then make exceptions for football. It is for this exact reason that Starbucks, for example, does not have a policy that says it must have a certain amount of English people working for them. On the grounds of consistency, the same principles must apply to football and, unlike in the case of the ‘6+5’ concept, the Football League’s quota satisfies EU regulations on the grounds that it is not based on players’ nationality, but on registration.

This is an important detail yet, I’m afraid, one that only further endorses a trend which is already happening far too much now anyway: the purchasing of very young players (16, 17 and 18... if not younger) by big clubs from either smaller English clubs or, more specifically, European-Union-based clubs, so as to 'naturalise' foreign players. If the quota rule is introduced to the Premier League, it will lead to a surge in this trend as big clubs will continue to buy (as opposed to develop from scratch) young players. Consider it a significant loophole in the finer points of the proposal.

There are, in this respect, loopholes in nearly all these types of rules, which is fundamentally why the issue will never be solved by regulation. Consider, if you will, a situation where Manchester United, for example, want to buy a 13yr old Brazilian boy who is tipped as a star in the making. Clearly it is illegal for the club to just ship him over to England, or even offer him money, but there is little anyone can do about pre-contracts ‘in kind’. This might exist in the form of looking out for the family, fulfilling certain promises and things like that. The club may even find a way for the boy’s father to get a job in England, fast-tracking the work-permit process on the way. This is not an issue of nationality, it is an issue of power and money.

It is also worth mentioning what the affect of the proposal might be on transfers, generally. I would suggest that any significant quota introduction is likely to further inflate the already-inflated price of English players. Foreign players tend to be less expensive than English players so, in terms of opportunity cost, it is often preferable for a club to buy a non-English player. However, as supply and demand levels change as a result of the quota demands, the value of an English player will increase exponentially against the fall in value of a foreign player.

On a similar note, I expect this will lead to an increase in the amount of loan transfers from the Premier League to the Championship, and below. It is likely that transfer fees will cool amongst smaller clubs as a result of higher levels of demand and supply for loan-contract players. Hypothetical increases in poaching trends should, in theory, mean the evolution of larger squads which would, thereby, mean more players being considered surplus to requirements at their registered club. This, in itself, is not necessarily a bad thing, although there is a risk that – at least from a financial perspective – it will further develop the disparity between the rich and the poor (i.e. the Premier League and the rest).

It’s certainly an interesting subject to think about. The many whys and wherefores of such an issue provoke a plethora of eventualities of which, it must be said, none are by any means guaranteed. Whatever the eventual implications, I think it is fair to say this matter says a lot about how football reflects the wider contexts of society.

My personal opinion is that too many rules and regulations can often only perpetuate problems which may, otherwise, have a better chance of sorting themselves out by means of a well-directed code of social education. ‘Nature’s Law’, as it were. Certainly I would suggest that an overall and harmonious focus on principles offers a flexibility that rules alone cannot.

In the specific case of English football, I wonder if a change of attitude is needed. We have become a nation so arrogant that we now stand as victims of our own, sometimes impossibly high, demands. We cannot have our cake and eat it, as the saying goes: Maybe the first step – at least with regard to quotas – should be to understand that it is not feasible to have the very best national team at the same time as having the very best and most cosmopolitan league in the World, for the simple reason that one comes at the expense of the other. Think about it…

beckham can succeed, if he stays for a while

Not yet content to call time on his career, David Beckham is proving quite the combatant in his old age. The England midfielder has agreed a three-month loan deal with AC Milan in a bid to win back his place in the England team ahead of the 2010 World Cup.

It had been expected that Beckham would spend the winter months training with Arsenal, having spent an extended period at their London Colney base at the beginning of last year. However, these plans were abandoned when it emerged that AC Milan were interested in signing him on a unique short-term deal. Crucially, this meant that Beckham would not just train, but play competitively as a full-term member of the first-team squad.

In principle, this looks like a very good move for both Beckham and Milan. Winter in England coincides with the close-season in America’s MLS (Major League Soccer), allowing Beckham to benefit from playing with and against top level footballers, thus, maintaining his competitiveness in the process. In return, Milan will benefit from having another world-class player available for selection, as well as the inevitable commercial advantages that association with Beckham brings.

In this sense, one might be cynical about Milan’s commercial motives: Beckham’s long-standing sponsor, Adidas, just happens to be Milan’s kit supplier and the club’s recent transfer policy under (President) Silvio Berlusconi has seen a large number of high-profile players join the club. Ronaldinho, Ronaldo, Shevchenko and now Beckham have all moved to the San Siro in the past year – resembling something similar to that of Florentino Perez’s Galactico era at Real Madrid.

That said, one can have little doubt about the genuine sporting motivation on the part of the player. It is widely accepted that Beckham should never have moved to America in the first place given the low standard of football in the MLS and – although publicly declaring himself happy – Beckham has conceded that his move to LA was, in part, decided by the fact that he believed his England career was over. With the 2010 World Cup in South Africa approaching – and Beckham a genuine contender to win back his place in the England team – a move to AC Milan represents one final opportunity to prove himself at the highest level.

In terms of style of football, it is clear to see how Beckham might be a success at an Italian club – so much so that I wonder if it was a mistake not to come to Italy sooner. The speed of the Italian game is certainly suited to him (tactical focus, patient and possession-orientated passing etc.) However, in Ronaldinho, Pirlo, Gattuso, Ambrosini, Kaka, Seedorf and Emerson the Italian club already have many good midfielders, to the extent that is hard to imagine where Beckham might fit in…

My personal belief is that Beckham could use his time in Italy to reinvent himself as a deep-lying playmaker in a role similar to that of his new team-mate, Andrea Pirlo. In this ‘quarterback’ role, his primary responsibility would be to take the ball off the defence to initiate attacks, operating just in front of the defenders and distributing from deep in his own territory. He would then have a second defensive midfielder next to him whose role would be more focused on off-the-ball duties. In theory, the role would be less physically demanding than right-midfield but would still allow Beckham to express himself creatively and dominate games as he does – he would also, typically, be granted more time on the ball which would suit a player of his passing style and ability.

Such a system is, of course, already in operation at Milan (with Andrea Pirlo playing alongside either Gattuso, Amrosini or both) but what is intriguing is the fact that the England manager, Fabio Capello, seems to intend for the national team to play this way. Capello actually tried Beckham in this position for Real Madrid and, although it was not considered a particular success, I think it worked well and has the potential to work well in the future.

Another aspect of the Italian game that may prove beneficial to Beckham – this time specifically relating to AC Milan – is that the club have a history of building a successful team around older players. The club’s captain, Paolo Maldini, is 40 and a large proportion of Milan’s squad are well into their thirties. But what is the secret to Milan’s high level of success amongst an older group of players? To many, the answer lies in the club’s state-of-the-art Milanello facilities and a scientific approach to training known as the ‘Milan Lab’. Based just outside of Milan, Milanelllo is a highly technologically-advanced centre for sport where attention to detail means that there are such facilities as a caged pitch – built with the intention to never let the ball go out of play, thus, improving the speed of passing and execution – and even a specially-designed high-altitude path which intends to aid player recovery at a superior rate than normal.

There is a good summary of the set-up at Milanello by a man called Mike Forde, who worked alongside Sam Allardyce as Bolton Wanderers' performance director a number of years ago. Forde describes the philosophy at Milanello in the following way: “The biggest element is a belief in treating the players individually – not just physically but mentally and emotionally. They've invested well in their facilities, obviously, but there's a cerebral process going on there. The key to it is that each player undergoes a screening process on a daily basis – biomechanically, neurologically, and so on”. Clearly such an approach would favour a player like Beckham, especially considering his age.

With a structure such as this in place, it is clear to see how Beckham might have been tempted to join Milan. However, it is worth noting that, from a political perspective, there were a number of complications which had put the transfer in doubt. Most notably was the happiness of the third-party, LA Galaxy. When Beckham joined LA Galaxy, he entered into more than just a financial or contractual commitment with a club. For a start, unlike in Europe, where clubs are run independently, the MLS franchise owns and largely controls all of its club members. This essentially means Beckham is owned by MLS (the equivalent of Cristiano Ronaldo being owned by the Premier League, as opposed to being owned by Manchester United). Needless to say, the league made a huge investment in Beckham – his contract at Galaxy reportedly costs $1m a week, consisting of a basic wage, club sponsorship and image rights (but still not including personal endorsements) – they even named a new law after him (entitled the ‘Beckham rule’) which essentially stated that one-off exceptions to the existing salary-cap can be made so long as the league sees it feasible and beneficial to the long-term state of soccer in America. In this respect, a key part of his agreement to join the league was that he works, not just as a player, but as an ambassador for MLS and as part of a project to increase public interest in the sport. As a result, Beckham needed to be diplomatic in the way he engineered a move to Milan so as not to negatively endorse MLS – this has, at least so far, been handled well.

Having chosen Milan, it is interesting to consider what other options were open to Beckham. Most intriguingly, I wonder whether it would have been possible for Beckham to engineer a short-term move to Arsenal instead. Arsene Wenger has often spoken of his respect for Beckham – he once even suggested Beckham fund his own move to Arsenal, albeit half-jokingly – and I think it is fair to assume that Beckham’s presence and experience amongst Wenger’s young squad would prove comparatively more beneficial to Arsenal than it would be to Milan. In this sense, I think the only question here would have been about money.

Indeed, one clear and fundamental difference between Milan and Arsenal exists in their transfer policy and relative budget. In his time in charge of Arsenal, Wenger has introduced and developed a bracketed wage structure that limits the amount the club will spend on its players’ salaries. Part of this structure means Arsenal refuse to offer long-term deals to players over the age of 30, and Wenger has typically proved reluctant to buy older players. This has much to do with Wenger’s commitment to buying and developing younger players. In contrast, the aristocracy at Milan have a history of buying established and often high-profile names, as mentioned earlier.

There would also be a number of personal benefits for Beckham in joining Arsenal, such as the language barrier and the fact that being in London would allow him the flexibility to fulfil other commitments (from his academy in Greenwich, to his sponsors, to leveraging his role in the London 2012 Olympic programme, to being near his family home etc.) That said, I would not be surprised if Beckham has become so cynical of the English press and public that he considered a move back to the Premier League too much of a risk to his reputation (plus there is the risk of alienating Manchester United fans etc.)

Nevertheless, Beckham has made his decision and there is little point in pondering what might have been. Time will tell if he succeeds at Milan – at very least he will benefit from the training, although I think it would be wasteful for the club not to make use of such a unique player. My perception is that Italy is a very good choice for Beckham, but I believe he needs to engineer a permanent move if he is to fully benefit from the set-up at Milan – something I fear may prove impossible given his extensive commitments in LA.