Friday 27 November 2009

ultras voice concern over plans to clean up calcio

The introduction of compulsory identity cards for fans has caused quite a stir amongst the often hostile but nonetheless powerful supporter movement that is the Ultras of Italy.

The plans are part of a wider approach by Italian football authorities to improve security and reduce levels of fan violence at games which has, in recent years, impacted negatively on match attendance levels.

However, the plans have been met by strong opposition – notably in the shape of angry supporters and reluctant clubs – which has forced the Italian Home Minister, Roberto Maroni, to further delay the start date of the scheme until the beginning of next season.

The details of the proposal are as follows: As of the beginning of next season, any person wishing to purchase either an away ticket to a given match or a season ticket will have to be in possession of an electronic identity card. The card will show a basic profile of the person, including a barcode which will be used to store data and monitor supporter activity.

Supporters will have to apply for the card which, crucially, will only be made available to those persons whose names have been cleared by local police. More specifically, this means that any supporters who have in the past been sentenced to stadium bans at any sports event will not be able to receive an identity card and, therefore, will be prohibited from purchasing tickets to matches.

As well as improving security, it is also hoped that the cards will facilitate the purchase of tickets and the access/flow of supporters to stadiums.

The overriding response to the plans, however, has so far been negative. Large groups of supporters – led by those involved in the Ultras movement – have shown their discontent having last month gathered in the streets of Rome to formally protest against what they consider to be a breach of “human rights”.

Something of an overstatement, I’m sure you’ll agree. Nonetheless, the Ultras groups are angry at the strict extent to which the rules are being applied, specifically relating to the fact that supporters with previous convictions – even including those who have been cleared – will also be prohibited under the new rules.

Moreover, they are concerned that their personal information will be used for marketing purposes, believing that the scheme is more about marketing opportunities for clubs and less about security.

The fact that there are already agreements in place with companies, including VISA and Telecom Italia has hardly helped to nullify the sense of unrest. Maroni’s admission that the scheme will be used as a means to build and develop “virtuous relationships” with supporters has also fuelled a sense of skepticism.

Yet, despite the apparent commercial benefits, the vast majority of Italian clubs are also opposed to the plans. The initial administration costs are huge – especially so for smaller clubs – which goes some way to explain why there has been such a delay in getting plans off the ground. Furthermore, there are concerns as to whether the scheme will actually work to reduce violence in the first place. Clubs are unconvinced, with many dismissing the cards as a gimmick and pointing out that the majority of hooliganism does not typically take place inside stadiums anyway.

From a PR perspective, too, clubs are reluctant to side against the Ultras groups in fear of backlash. In this respect, there is also a concern that the scheme will end up alienating live spectators – specifically ‘casual’ spectators who do not regularly attend matches – encouraging more supporters to stay at home and watch a match on television.

Whether or not the scheme turns out to be a success remains to be seen. The sentiment of the Italian Government and other football authorities to try to clean up the sport is commendable, but I wonder if they might be better off spending their money elsewhere, notably on developing the overall culture of the matchday experience. Initiatives such as free entry for children, better policing and improvements to stadium infrastructure have been successful in England and Germany and could also work in Italy.

Either way, the Ultras groups should take a look at themselves and their own behaviour before grumbling about civil liberties. It is ironic that many of those who have caused such problems in the first place should now have the nerve to protest about how they are treated. Whilst those who are guilty of violent offences to an extent surrender the privilege of ‘human rights’, those who are innocent should be more appreciative towards those trying to protect them. Are these not the same people that would complain about a lack of police intervention, should an attack regrettably take place?

Monday 9 November 2009

spanish taxman no longer feeling generous

If you drive a car, he’ll tax the street. If you try to sit, he’ll tax your seat. What the late George Harrison didn’t tell us about the Taxman, however, is that if you are a footballer, you will no longer be eligible for the generous tax breaks that have, up until now, been a key factor in encouraging players to move to Spain.

In 2004, the Spanish Government passed a law to lower the tax bracket for high-level ‘foreign executives’ working in the country in an attempt to attract multinational corporations and more of the world’s top professionals to Spain. This law was specifically applicable to non-Spanish residents earning an annual salary of €600,000 or more. This, therefore, included footballers.

Up until now, this has had a favourable impact on football in Spain, providing clubs with a selling-point in which to attract overseas players and, thus, also providing them with a competitive advantage over much of the rest of Europe.

Where foreign players in Germany, Italy and France were paying 45%, 43% and 40% income tax respectively – the rate was 40% in England, although, this will now increase to 50% from April next year – in Spain they were only being asked to pay 23%.

Naturally, this was beneficial to the players in question, who were able to pay significantly less in tax than their counterparts in Europe’s other big leagues, notably that of Italy and England. Yet, this was also beneficial for the clubs in Spain whose marginal costs – relating to players’ salaries – were significantly reduced, especially because many footballers nowadays command contracts based on after-tax salary demands.

To put this into context, this meant that if a player like Kaka wanted to earn an annual salary of, say, £8m after tax, it would cost his club – Real Madrid – just over £10m a year. However, if Chelsea were to offer him the same deal next year, it would cost them about £16m a year. Needless to say, over the course of a five-year contract and a cumulative difference of about £30m, this becomes very expensive.

Very expensive, too, for the Spanish Government. Indeed, after five years of shortfall in public revenue, an agreement is now in place to scrap this rule and start taxing footballers at a rate that is more in line with the rest of Europe.

Consequently, the new law proposes that the tax bracket for these high-earning overseas players should be raised from 24% to 43%. Subject, of course, to parliamentary approval.

Unsurprisingly, the plans have caused much irritation amongst Spanish clubs, the majority of whom argue that the new tax bracket will discourage foreign players from coming to La Liga. Furthermore, they argue that it is the clubs, not the players, that will end up carrying the weight of the taxes, with the aforementioned trend in after-tax salary guarantees – ‘net’ as opposed to ‘gross’ salaries – making it increasingly impossible for clubs to afford such players.

Others, however, are a little less sympathetic, arguing that the tax authorities should treat everyone equally and also that, in an institutional sense, it is the clubs’ fault for allowing players to be paid after-tax salaries in the first place.

More realistically, however, the new proposal represents little more than a marginal blow to the overall competitivity of La Liga. With this in mind, the extent of the impact surrounding such plans should be looked upon with a sense of perspective.

Firstly, because it will not be implemented retrospectively, the new law will not affect players who have already signed contracts with Spanish clubs. Crucially, this means that such players as Kaka and Cristiano Ronaldo – both of whom have recently joined Real Madrid and earn in advance of €160,000 per week – will remain exempt from the new taxation laws, at least until they sign a new contract.

Secondly, it is important to consider that the new proposal will still leave Spanish football in a comparatively good position. With the new tax rates roughly on par with the rest of Europe, this is hardly the same as being left significantly worse off.

Furthermore, the rules only apply to a minority band of well-paid ‘imports’, most of whom are being paid so much anyway that, if a club has enough money to afford them in the first place, then the relative difference in cost – relative to the overall revenue and/or cost of running such a club – is unlikely to affect them too dramatically. This is especially true in the case of clubs like Real Madrid and Barcelona although, admittedly, less so for smaller clubs such as Getafe, Tenerife and so on.

In other words, whilst the new law may end up costing the ‘super’ clubs the most, it is also true that they can afford it the most. Given, then, that the overall perception of La Liga is largely determined by the condition of Real Madrid and Barcelona – at least in a superficial sense – then the proposal is unlikely to have too much of a negative affect on the league as a collective.